intrODUCtiOn anD Overview
The Medicare physician fee schedule was established as part of the 1989 Omni bus Budget Reconciliation Act. In addition to establishing a standardized payment sched ule based on a resourcebased rela tive value scale, it established a physician payment formula based on achievement of an expenditure target-the volume perfor mance standard (VPS). However, the VPS approach had several methodological flaws that prompted its replacement with the sus tainable growth rate (SGR) system in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. Nonetheless, the SGR approach has run into difficulties as well, including volatile updates that in some years have been too high and in oth ers too low (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2005) .
The SGR, and its predecessor the VPS, are budgetary tools, but they do not establish strong incentives for provid ers to slow volume and intensity growth. These approaches have several key weak nesses. They are national targets, which dilute incentives so as to be barely notice able for any individual provider. Providers who restrain volume are treated the same as those who do not. Also, their national scope means they do not take into account regional or local variations in market condi tions that may affect rates of expenditure growth. Finally, they apply only to phy sician expenditures, which are a minor ity of total Medicare expenditures, and do not give providers incentives to coordinate services along the continuum of care or to improve quality of care.
The Medicare PGP demonstration, which is Medicare's first physician P4P initiative, attempts to overcome these limitations by establishing incentives for QI and cost effi ciency at the level of the PGP. A legislative mandate for the PGP demonstration was included in the Medicare, Medicaid • Encouraging investment in administra tive structures and processes for efficient service delivery.
• Rewarding physicians for improving health care processes and outcomes. The PGP demonstration started on April 1, 2005, and will run for 3 years. In addition, calendar year 2004 is used as a baseline for cost and quality performance assessment.
The premise of the PGP demonstra tion is that PGPs can achieve higher qual ity and greater cost efficiency by managing and coordinating patient care. The physi cian groups participating in the PGP dem onstration are engaged in a wide variety of care management interventions to improve the cost efficiency and quality of health care for Medicare feeforservice (FFS) patients . These inter ventions include: chronic disease manage ment programs, highrisk/highcost care management, transitional care manage ment, endoflife/palliative care programs, practice standardization, and QI programs. In addition, information technology, such as electronic medical records, patient dis ease registries, and patient monitoring sys tems, are being used by PGP participants to improve practice efficiency and quality of care delivered to patients, and to bet ter understand the utilization of services by the Medicare FFS population. The PGP demonstration will test whether care man agement initiatives generate cost savings by reducing avoidable hospital admissions, readmissions, and emergency department visits, while at the same time improving the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries.
The PGP demonstration employs a shared savings provider payment model in which savings in Medicare expenditures are shared between participating physi cian groups and the Medicare Program. In effect, this model is a hybrid between the FFS and capitation payment methods. Providers continue to be paid under FFS rules, and beneficiaries are not enrolled (i.e., they retain complete freedom of pro vider choice). However, participating phy sician groups are able to retain-through annual performance payments in addition to their FFS revenues-part of any savings in Medicare expenditures that they gener ate for their patients. This shared savings payment model gives participating provid ers a financial incentive to control the vol ume and intensity of medical services, such as exists under capitated payment. Moreover, a higher portion of savings is retained by physician groups the better their measured quality of care. In this way, incentives for both cost efficiency and QI are introduced into FFS payment. Because participating providers retain only part of the savings generated by reducing expen ditures, incentives for underservice and risk selection are lower than under full cap itated payment. Another difference from capitation is that the Medicare Program shares in any savings, benefiting from cost efficiency improvements and lowering government expenditures.
In this article we describe the design of the PGP demonstration (Pope et al., 2002; Kautter et al., 2004; Trisolini et al., 2005) , which builds on the groupspecific volume performance standards design (Tompkins et al., 1996; Wallack and Tompkins, 2003) . 1 We first explain the PGP demonstration's key design elements, including the selec tion process for PGP participants; benefi ciary assignment; comparison population; measurement of demonstration savings; performance payments; and quality mea surement and reporting. We then provide a summary of early case study findings for the PGP demonstration. Finally, we conclude with a review and discussion of several key issues.
PartiCiPant SeleCtiOn PrOCeSS
As shown in Table 1 , 10 physician groups, located across the Nation, are participating in the PGP demonstration. They were selected through a competitive process by CMS, based on organizational structure, operational feasibility, geographic location, and implementation strategy. Large PGPs were selected to ensure that participants would have the administrative and clinical capabilities necessary to respond to the PGP demonstration's incentives. Further, large PGPs treat sufficient numbers of Medicare beneficiaries so that the calcu lation of performance payments is statisti cally reliable. An additional requirement for participating PGPs to be multispecialty groups is consistent with the expectation that PGP demonstration participants must possess the capacity to respond to incen tives by coordinating care across multiple provider types and sites of care. The par ticipating PGPs all have at least 200 physi cians, and together represent more than 5,000 physicians. They include freestanding group practices, components of integrated delivery systems, faculty group practices, and physician network organizations.
BeneFiCiarY aSSignMent
A key aspect of the PGP demonstra tion design is patient attribution, or benefi ciary assignment. The intent of the PGP demonstration is to create an incentive for each participating PGP to coordinate and manage the health care of the ben eficiaries assigned to it. A PGP's ability to coordinate and manage the health care of a beneficiary depends on: (1) the type of services the PGP provides to the benefi ciary, and (2) the overall control the PGP has over the beneficiary's utilization of ser vices. Because the PGP demonstration is a Medicare FFS innovation, there is no enroll ment process whereby beneficiaries accept or reject involvement. Therefore, we devel oped a methodology to assign beneficiaries to participating PGPs based on utilization of Medicarecovered services. Extensive simulations of alternative assignment meth ods were conducted using multiple years of historical data on several large PGPs. Characteristics of assignment methodolo gies that we examined included the type of services provided by the PGPs to beneficia ries (Part B physician services, evaluation and management (E&M) services, outpa tient E&M services); the share of a bene ficiary's utilization provided by a PGP (e.g., all, majority, plurality, any); and, the type of physician (primary care, specialist) treating the beneficiary.
We evaluated the alternative assign ment methodologies on two criteria: pro vider responsibility and sample size. First, providers must believe that the numbers and types of services they provide mean that they have primary responsibility for the health care of beneficiaries assigned to them. Otherwise, PGPs may have difficulty responding effectively to the demonstra tion incentives, so the assignment method ology will lack face validity. Second, sam ple size is critically important for the statistical reliability of performance measurement. If the number of beneficiaries assigned to a participating PGP is too low, then cost and quality performance measurement may be unstable.
We concluded that a beneficiary should be assigned to a participating PGP if the PGP provided the largest share, i.e., the plural ity, of outpatient E&M services to the ben eficiary. A beneficiary who receives at least one office or other outpatient E&M service from a participating PGP during a given year is eligible for assignment to the PGP in that year. If the beneficiary received more of those services (as measured by Medicare allowed charges) from the PGP than from any other physician practice (group or solo), then the beneficiary is assigned to the PGP. Certain E&M services, such as emergency department visits, do not reflect the PGP's ability to manage and coordinate the health care of beneficiaries, and are not used in the beneficiary assignment methodology.
Beneficiary assignment is redetermined after each year based on that year's utiliza tion patterns. A result of this assignment methodology is that no beneficiary can be assigned to more than one PGP, preventing CMS from paying performance payments more than once when multiple PGPs serve overlapping patient populations.
For the assignment methodology pre viously outlined, our simulation analysis showed that (1) approximately 50 percent of beneficiaries that were provided at least one Part B physician service by the PGP during a year were assigned to the PGP, with groups with greater primary care ori entation having more patients assigned; (2) approximately 50 to 70 percent of ben eficiaries that received at least one outpa tient E&M service from the PGP during a year were assigned to the PGP; (3) PGPs provided around 80 to 90 percent of the out patient E&M services for their assigned beneficiaries; and, (4) PGPs generally retained approximately twothirds of their assigned beneficiaries from one year to the next. While alternative assignment meth odologies performed better on our sample size criterion (e.g., assignment based on Part B physician services) or on our pro vider responsibility criterion (e.g., assign ment based on the majority of utilization), none of the alternative assignment method ologies performed better on both criteria. In addition, a prior study of several large PGPs concluded, based on physician inter view results, that PGPs believed they had primary responsibility for the health care of patients to whom they had provided the plu rality of outpatient E&M services (McCall et al., 1998) .
The assignment methodology incorpo rates outpatient E&M services provided by specialists as well as by primary care physicians. One reason for this is that spe cialists (e.g., cardiologists) often are the principal primary care provider for elderly and chronically ill patients, and it is reason able to expect them to take responsibility for these patients. In addition, the assign ment methodology provides an opportu nity for specialists to take responsibility for assuring that their patients' primary care needs are being met even if the specialist is primarily treating a specific problem on a referral basis. 2 For the PGP demonstration's base year, the number of Medicare FFS patients assigned to the 10 physician groups ranged from 8,383 to 44,609, and totaled 223,203. Overall for the 10 physician groups, the percentage of assigned patients that were female was 57.5 percent, dually eligible for Medicare/Medicaid was 13.3 percent, and age 85 or over was 10.3 percent. These distributions were broadly similar to the Medicare FFS population (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2006) .
COMPariSOn POPUlatiOn
The purpose of the comparison popula tion in the PGP demonstration is to provide a benchmark for the cost control perfor mance of the participating PGP. Spe cif i cally, to predict what the per capita expendi ture growth of PGP assigned beneficiaries would have been in the absence of the PGP demonstration. Growth in per capita expen ditures is influenced by local factors includ ing changes in wages and other input costs, diffusion of new medical techniques and technologies, practice style variations, com petition, population density, and character istics of local medical care providers. For this reason, local Medicare beneficiaries not assigned to the participating PGP are a natural comparison population. With this comparison population, the participating PGP will earn a performance payment if it performs better than its local competitors, who face similar market conditions.
A convenient way to define a PGP's ser vice area is by the residence location of beneficiaries assigned to it. This patient origin approach to service area definition has been widely studied and recommended for hospitals (Baker, 2001 ), and appears to apply equally well to identifying PGP ser vice areas. Defining service areas by patient origin is an empirically based method that reflects the actual catchment area of each participating PGP. It does this more accu rately than prespecified administrative units such as the county, metropolitan sta tistical area, or State, or than prespecified geographic radiuses, such as 15 miles from the practice location. The service areas of multilocation practices are accurately iden tified with the patient origin approach, and are automatically adjusted for changes in practice locations when the service area is annually updated.
As part of the PGP demonstration design process, we calculated several alternative patientoriginbased service areas for indi vidual PGPs. The alternatives differed on the criterion for including counties in a PGP's service area, specifically what per centage of a PGP's assigned beneficiaries must reside in a county for it to be included in the service area. The alternatives were evaluated on the following criteria:
• Includes the areas where most of the PGP assigned beneficiaries reside.
• Sufficient comparison population sam ple size to provide a stable target growth rate computation.
• Service area is geographically compact and contiguous and has face validity.
• Minimizes data collection and com pu ta tion burdens (by including fewer counties).
• Satisfies first four criteria for a wide range of sizes, types, and locations of PGPs (e.g., urban, rural, large, small, PGPs drawing from a wide range of counties and those drawing from only a few counties). We concluded that counties where at least 1 percent of a PGP's assigned beneficiaries reside should comprise its service area. These counties typically include 80 to 90 percent or more of a PGP's assigned benefi ciaries and satisfy our other criteria. Each participating PGP's service area is defined for the base year and redefined for each performance year, and may differ between years to reflect changes in the location of the PGP's assigned beneficiaries.
The comparison population for the PGP is drawn from the PGP's service area. To ensure that the comparison population is similar to beneficiaries assigned to the participating PGP, the comparison benefi ciaries must meet similar criteria, for exam ple, a comparison beneficiary must have received at least one office or other outpa tient E&M service. Beneficiaries assigned to a participating PGP in the current or any prior performance year, or beneficiaries that received any office or other outpatient E&M services at the PGP in the current performance year, are not eligible for the comparison population. These beneficiaries may be affected by the incentives provided by the PGP demonstration.
MeaSUreMent OF SavingS
Demonstration savings, termed Medi care savings, measures the cost savings impact of the PGP demonstration, and defines the pool of savings that the partici pating physician groups and the Medicare Program share. To calculate Medicare sav ings in a performance year, first the partici pating PGP's annual per capita expenditure target is calculated (all expenditures are on a per capita basis):
Target Expenditures = PGP Base Year Ex pend itures × (1 + Comparison Group Growth Rate).
Target expenditures in the demonstra tion are PGPspecific; they are based on each PGP's base year expenditure level. PGP base year per capita expenditures are cal culated for beneficiaries assigned to the PGP in the base year. The compar ison group growth rate is defined as the growth in per capita expenditures in the PGP's comparison population between the base and performance years. Both the PGP base year expenditures and the comparison group expenditure growth rate are adjusted for casemix change between the base and performance years using a modification of the CMS hierarchical condition catego ries (HCC), or CMSHCC, riskadjustment model Olmsted, Pope, and Kautter, 2006) .
Medicare savings are computed as the difference between the per capita expen diture target and the PGP's per capita expenditures in the performance year (for beneficiaries assigned to the PGP in the performance year), 3 multiplied by the num ber of fulltime equivalent (FTE) beneficia ries (person years) assigned to the PGP in the performance year: 4
Medicare Savings = (Target Expenditures -PGP Performance Year Actual Expenditures) × FTE Assigned Beneficiaries.
This is a retrospective calculation, be cause neither actual nor target expendi tures are known until after the end of the performance year.
3 Performance year expenditures are annualized by dividing ex penditures by the fraction of the year alive and enrolled in Medicare. Performance year per capita expenditures are then weighted by this fraction. 4 To determine FTE beneficiaries, the fraction of the year each beneficiary was alive and enrolled in Medicare is calculated. FTE beneficiaries equal the sum of these fractions (i.e., equals number of person years). Figure 1 shows the process of calcu lating performance payments in the PGP demonstration. For each PGP, the first step involves determining whether or not annual Medicare savings are more than 2 percent of target expenditures. The 2percent threshold is used to account for normal variation in expenditures. 5 Given that observed expenditures represent a combination of PGP costsaving perfor mance and normal variation, the higher the threshold, the less likely it is that per formance payments will be paid due to nor mal variation (undeserved performance payments), but also the less likely it is that performance payments will be paid due to PGP cost saving behavior (deserved per formance payments). A simulation anal ysis showed that a 2percent threshold represented a reasonable balance between paying deserved performance payments and not paying undeserved performance payments (Pope and Chromy, 1997) .
PerFOrManCe PaYMentS
If the PGP holds the expenditures for its assigned beneficiaries more than 2 percent below its target, it is eligible to earn a per formance payment for that performance year (assuming there are no accrued losses from previous years). The net Medicare savings are calculated as the amount of annual Medicare savings more than the 2percent threshold.
The sharing rate for net Medicare savings was set high enough to give PGPs sufficient incentive to participate in the demonstra tion, including rewards for improving and delivering highquality care, while allowing for significant Medicare Program savings. Based on simulation analysis, we deter mined that an 80percent sharing rate met these criteria. As shown in Figure 1 , the net Medicare savings are divided, with 80 5 Normal variation may arise from variations in the incidence of disease from year to year, or in claims-paying operations. percent going to the PGP performance payment pool and 20 percent retained by Medicare as program savings. The PGP performance payment pool is then itself divided between a cost performance pay ment and a maximum quality performance payment. In performance year 1, the cost performance payment and maximum qual ity performance payment shares of the PGP performance payment pool are 70 and 30 percent, respectively. In performance year 2, the respective shares are 60 and 40 percent, and in performance year 3, the shares are 50 and 50 percent. This was done to gradually increase the importance of quality performance in the PGP demon stration. The actual quality performance payment is then determined, based on the percentage of the PGP demonstration's quality targets the PGP met in the perfor mance year. If all of the quality targets are met, then the entire maximum quality per formance payment is earned by the PGP. However, if some of the quality targets are not met, then a portion of the maximum quality performance payment is retained by the Medicare Program.
Once the actual quality performance payment has been determined, it is added to the cost performance payment to iden tify the preliminary earned performance payment, as shown in Figure 1 . However, to avoid incentives for excessive cost cut ting, the actual earned performance pay ment cannot be more than 5 percent of the PGP's target expenditures, which includes both Parts A and B expenditures; the final earned performance payment is capped at that 5 percent level if the preliminary earned performance payment is higher.
Finally, the performance payment paid to the PGP at the annual settlement will equal 75 percent of the earned performance pay ment amount. The other 25 percent of the earned performance payment will be with held until the end of the demonstration to protect Medicare against losses the PGP may generate in subsequent years. At the final settlement, at the end of the demonstration, the cumulative amount of the withheld performance payments will be paid to PGP, after accounting for any accrued losses. In a performance year, participating PGPs may perform worse than their com parison group and generate losses. That is, assigned beneficiary expenditures may exceed target expenditures, in which case Medicare savings are negative. Losses are defined as (negative) Medicare savings in excess of 2 percent of target expenditures. PGPs are protected against normal varia tion in expenditures between 0 and 2 per cent. In addition, PGPs are not at risk to reimburse the Medicare Program for either annual losses or an accrued net loss at final settlement. However, annual losses are carried forward to the subsequent perfor mance year and are used to offset (positive) Medicare savings generated in that year. No performance payment can be earned in a performance year unless Medicare sav ings are sufficient to offset accrued losses from prior performance years.
Annual Medicare savings between 2 and +2 percent of target expenditures generate neither losses to be carried for ward nor performance payments to be paid (Figure 1 ). This portion of the annual Medicare savings (between -and + 2 per cent) is assumed to be caused by normal variations in expenditure levels, not by the PGP's performance.
Cost savings are measured cumulatively from the original demonstration base year. Rebasing-meaning updating the base year for setting targets for the annual per formance payment computation-does not occur. Not rebasing gives participating PGPs the maximum incentive to generate savings during the demonstration period. However, if the PGP demonstration model becomes part of the Medicare Program, periodic rebasing would be necessary to continue to provide incentives for improving the quality and efficiency of care and lockin prior year savings so as not to indefinitely reward groups for prior performance.
QUalitY MeaSUreMent anD rePOrting
In this section we describe the qual ity measurement and reporting methods applied in the PGP demonstration. This includes quality (1) measurement, (2) tar gets, and (3) measurement processes and performance calculation. Both claims based and medical recordbased meth ods are used. Initially, the demonstration design included only claimsbased qual ity measures. However, we worked with CMS to engage the physician groups par ticipating in the demonstration to expand the quality measurement and reporting process to medical recordbased measures which resulted in a consensus agreement for measuring and rewarding quality under the demonstration.
Quality

Measurement
Our overall approach had four main goals. First, we aimed to include a broad range of quality measures, so that par ticipating PGPs would need to focus on a broad range of quality of care interven tions and not just a select few. The dan ger with including only a small number of quality meas ures is that participating groups might focus excessively on them, to the detriment of other important qual ity of care objectives. This must be bal anced against the added data collection and administrative burden imposed by includ ing a wider range of meas ures. In addition, the number of measures should not be so broad that the incentive value of any indi vidual measure becomes too weak to be an effective motivator.
The second goal was to use well estab lished and validated quality measures, so that physicians practicing in the groups would accept them as appropriate. The third goal was to include quality measures pri marily focused on ambulatory care, because that is the main setting for care provided by PGPs that focuses on coordination of care and prevention. Finally, the fourth goal was to focus on conditions highly prevalent in the Medicare population as well as condi tions that account for a significant portion of Medicare spending.
A summary table that describes the PGP demonstration quality measures is presented as Table 2 . The demonstra tion includes 32 quality measures cover ing four modules: (1) diabetes mellitus, (2) heart failure, (3) coronary artery dis ease, and (4) hypertension and preventive care. Each of the four modules includes quality measures applied only to beneficia ries with those specific diseases. However, the fourth module also includes measures applied to all beneficiaries that meet age and sex criteria. To demonstrate a high level of performance on quality of care for the demonstration, PGP participants will need to work actively to improve or maintain quality across a broad range of diseases and conditions.
The 32 quality measures are a sub set of those developed by CMS' Quality Measurement and Health Assessment Group for the Doctors Office Quality (DOQ) Project (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2005) . As a result, they have been well established and validated through the extensive review process conducted as part of the DOQ project. The DOQ measures are also focused on care provided in ambu latory settings, which is emphasized in the PGP demonstration.
The 32 quality measures will be phased in so as to reduce the administrative bur den faced by the PGP participants in col lecting the medical records data needed for the 25 measures that require that type of data. 6 The schedule for phasing in the quality measures across the demonstration performance years is as follows: Targets PGP participants are eligible to earn sep arate quality performance payments if they meet quality performance targets for each of the quality measures. For each measure, PGP participants must achieve at least one of three targets. The first two are thresh old targets and the third is an improvement target:
• Achieve the higher of 75 percent com pliance or the Medicare Health Plan Em ployer Data and Information Set (HEDIS ® ) mean for the measure (for those measures where HEDIS ® indicators are also available). • Achieve the 70th percentile Medicare HEDIS ® level (for those measures where HEDIS ® indicators are also available). • Demonstrate a 10percent or greater re duction in the gap between the administra tive baseline and 100 percent com pliance. An example of how the improvement target is calculated is as follows. If a PGP achieves 40 percent compliance for a qual ity measure in the base year (2004) , then the gap between that level and 100 percent is 60 percent. As a result, the PGP must reduce the gap by 10 percent of 60 percent, or 6 percentage points, so its QI target is 46 percent. If the PGP achieves 46 percent compliance with the quality measure in any of the three performance years of the dem onstration, then it will be judged as having met the QI target for that measure for that year.
By including both threshold and im provement targets, participating groups are provided positive incentives for quality whether they start out at either high or low levels on measured quality for each indica tor. If only threshold targets were included, then groups starting at low levels of quality might view the targets as unachievable. In contrast, if only improvement targets were included, then groups starting at high levels of quality might view further improvements as difficult to achieve.
Data Collection and Performance Calculation
Claims data analysis is used to calculate 7 of the 32 quality measures. They are given a weight of four in the overall performance calculation. The other 25 quality measures are calculated using only data from medical record abstraction or other internal PGP data systems. They are given a weight of one in the overall performance calculation.
The lower weight for medical record based measures reflects the additional administrative burden to report those mea sures and the potential for larger varia tion because they are calculated from a random sample of 411 eligible beneficia ries. That sample size is adapted from the approach used for HEDIS ® quality mea sures (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2005) . Because medical record review can be costly, a sampling approach is permitted for those measures. In con trast, the claimsbased measures are cal culated on all of the beneficiaries eligible for a given quality measure at each PGP, because the data required to compute those rates are available from existing claims data. They have larger sample sizes (for example, some PGPs have several thousand diabetics), the required data are easily available, and their results are sub ject to less sampling variation; as a result, they receive higher weights in the overall performance calculation.
To calculate the overall quality perfor mance for a given PGP, the number of quality measures for which the PGP has achieved either a threshold or improve ment target is first calculated. Then the total weighted quality score is calculated by adding the value for each quality mea sure where a target was reached, either four or one, depending on the type of mea surement. The weighted score for the PGP is then divided by the total possible score for the given performance year. The ratio is then applied to the quality portion of the performance payment pool to calcu late the performance payment for quality (Figure 1 ).
earlY CaSe StUDY reSUltS
We conducted site visits to each of the 10 PGP participants during the first per formance year of the PGP demonstration . The purpose of these site visits was to understand the decisions of the PGPs to participate in the demon stration and their early implementation and operational experience with the dem onstration. We interviewed demonstration sites about their reasons for joining the PGP demonstration, and their strategies for responding to its incentives. In general, physician groups report that their main rea son for participating in the PGP demon stration is their interest in improving and managing patient care, their belief that this is the right thing to do for patients, and the alignment of the PGP demonstration with their mission and vision of the future of health care. Many of the participants have experience and infrastructure for care man agement from prior involvement with pri vate insurers or Medicare managed care.
They now wish to apply this orientation to the Medicare FFS population as part of their overall strategy of providing value to payers. They believe that participating in the PGP demonstration will position them to succeed in the future health care envi ronment, which will reward the provision of high quality and efficient care. PGP participants are implementing a variety of initiatives to improve the quality and efficiency of health care for Medicare FFS patients. These include chronic dis ease management, highrisk/highcost care management, managing transitions between care settings (e.g., inpatient to outpatient), endoflife/palliative care pro grams, and standardizing care around evidencebased protocols.
It is expected that care management programs will generate cost savings by reducing avoidable hospital admissions, readmissions, and emergency department visits. PGPs have flexibility in designing care management strategies to be success ful under the demonstration. Several PGP participants initially focused on reducing avoidable admissions and readmissions among congestive heart failure patients, increasing influenza and pneumovax vac cine rates because of the potential for short term payback, and improving transitions in care focusing on making sure newly dis charged patients receive timely followup care. In addition, several PGP participants are focusing on a small number of very expensive patients, usually those who are hospitalized multiple times because these patients may show the largest effect from care management interventions by reduc ing avoidable readmissions.
PGP participants have been able to respond to the financial incentives under the demonstration, in many instances, through the enhancement and application of exist ing care management and information tech nology infrastructure and applying it to the Medicare FFS population. PGP participants are relying mostly on inhouse personnel, expertise, and enhancements to existing information technology infrastructure to implement their care management strate gies, although some are partnering with, or have purchased systems from, outside vendors. In general, participants are strong proponents of providerbased care manage ment because it builds off of their existing relationship with the patient and provides a consistent approach across the physician's practice making it easier to obtain physician buyin.
PGP participants have indicated they view the demonstration quality measure methods used to assess and reward high performance and improvement as gener ally appropriate. However, most PGP par ticipants commented that the additional resources required to collect data for med ical recordbased measures were more than expected due to the addition of the clinical recordbased measures. But it is anticipated that the cost will decline some what in future years as the initial costs of developing systems and processes for col lecting chartbased measures on a flow basis will not recur. The PGP participants' main strategies to improve their perfor mance on the quality indicators are: (1) provider education and feedback including data profile reports comparing individual providers to their peers or other bench marks, (2) better adherence to quality of care protocols on the part of both patients and physicians through care management interventions, and (3) implementation of standardized, evidencebased care models and protocols.
DiSCUSSiOn
Medicare is exploring alternative ap proaches to improving the quality of care it pays for and controlling its costs. In the 1990s, managed care was a favored approach, but it has suffered setbacks in recent years (Robinson, 2001 ). More recently, P4P has been considered a prom ising approach (Bodenheimer et al., 2005) . The PGP demonstration is Medicare's first physician P4P initiative. Unlike some other P4P initiatives, the PGP demonstration explicitly establishes incentives for cost effi ciency as well as QI. It is a providerbased model that relies on the physician group as the organizational means to improve the quality and cost efficiency of care.
The PGP demonstration model changes provider payment, not the insurance arrangements of Medicare beneficiaries, who remain enrolled in the traditional FFS program with complete freedom of pro vider choice. Disruptions to providers are minimized by the maintenance of stan dard FFS Medicare payments to them. The innovation of the PGP demonstra tion model is that participating provider groups have the opportunity to earn addi tional performance payments for provid ing high quality and cost efficient care. They share the savings they create in the care of beneficiaries assigned to them with the Medicare Program, and retain more of the savings the higher their measured quality of care. The financial risk to pro viders is mitigated by the continuation of FFS payment, the use of providerspecific base costs as a starting point for measur ing savings, and the lack of penalties for underperformance. Providers do face busi ness risk for their investments in staff and systems to improve quality and generate savings, because they do not receive any upfront payments from Medicare. They may also forego some FFS revenues from rationalizing services provided, depend ing on whether additional demand for their services can be found to replace the foregone services.
The PGP demonstration payment model retains important FFS advantages as compared with capitation: for beneficiaries, freedom of provider choice, and for provid ers, no insurance risk and fewer incentives for stinting on services and avoiding the sickest patients. Theoretical analyses by health economists suggests that hybrid or mixed capitation/FFS models, such as the PGP demonstration model, may be prefer able to either pure FFS or pure capitated payment (Ellis and McGuire, 1986) .
In addition to establishing incentives to control volume of services, the PGP demonstration model takes advantage of the Medicare FFS program's market power to hold down the FFS rates paid to providers. Rather than relying on abso lute cost control targets, the PGP dem onstration model establishes yardstick competition (Schliefer, 1985) among pro viders by employing a local comparison group to judge costcontrol performance. Expenditure growth performance targets are reasonable and feasible, because the baseline levels used for comparison have been achieved by other providers in the local market.
Like all payment innovations, the PGP demonstration faces some challenges. For example, it remains to be seen how much control a demonstration partici pant can exert over its assigned beneficia ries when they retain freedom of provider choice and have limited incentives to restrain their use of services. 7 In addi tion, the quality measures applied in this demonstration focus on ambulatory care for chronic diseases. Future efforts could reward additional types of quality, such as in acute care hospitalization and post acute care episodes. Nevertheless, the
